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Abstract
In almost every scientific field, an experiment involves collecting data
and then analysing it. The analysis stage will often consist in trying to
extract some physical parameter and estimating its uncertainty; this is
known as Parameter Determination. An example would be the determi-
nation of the mass of the top quark, from data collected from high energy
proton-proton collisions. A different aim is to choose between two possi-
ble hypotheses. For example, are data on the recession speed s of distant
galaxies proportional to their distance d, or do they fit better to a model
where the expansion of the Universe is accelerating?
There are two fundamental approaches to such statistical analyses -
Bayesian and Frequentist. This article discusses the way they differ in
their approach to probability, and then goes on to consider how this affects
the way they deal with Parameter Determination and Hypothesis Testing.
The examples are taken from every-day life and from Particle Physics.
1 INTRODUCTION
There are two fundamental approaches to statistical analysis, Bayesianism and
Frequentism. The Bayesian approach dates back to Reverend Thomas Bayes,
whose paper was publishes posthumously in 1763. The Polish statistician Jerzey
Neyman played a crucial role in the development of frequentist statistics. In the
past there have been vigorous discussions about the relative merits of these two
methods (see fig. 2).
In this article, the fundamental differences between these two approaches will
be explained, and illustrated with examples from Physics and from every-day
life. We consider them in situations where we are trying to measure a parameter
(e.g. the mass of the top quark), or are testing hypotheses (e.g. do we have
evidence for the existence of the Higgs boson?)
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Figure 1: The Reverend Bayes (left), whose paper on his theorem was published
posthumously in 1763; and Jerzy Neyman, a Polish statistician who played a
crucial role in the development of the frequentist approach.
1.1 Why the fuss?
Given that there are these fundamentally different ways of analysing data, how
is it possible that many scientists spend a lifetime measuring all sorts of physical
parameters, without being aware of the sharp differences of philosophy between
the Bayesian and Frequentist approaches? The answer is that in the simplest
of problems the two methods (and others too, like χ2 or maximum likelihood)
can give the identical answer, that the probability that a parameter µ lies in the
range µl to µu is, say, 68%. By the ‘simplest of problems’, we mean that the
measured value m is Gaussian distributed about the true value µ with known
variance σ2, and that µ can in principle have any value from minus infinity to
plus infinity.
However, in many practical problems in Particle Physics, these conditions
are not satisfied. The parameter may be restricted in range (masses cannot
be negative), and the data distribution may not be Gaussian (counting exper-
iments often follow the Poisson distribution). So there is ample opportunity
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Figure 2: This incident from the Wold Cup soccer final in 2006 was used to il-
lustrate the ‘discussions’ that took place between sub-groups within a particular
experiment about the relative merits of Bayesian and Frequentist analyses[1].
for the results of Bayesian and frequentist analyses to differ. The two types of
statisticians have often had strong criticisms of each other’s approach.
1.2 Probability
The differences between the Bayesians and Frequentists start with their in-
terpretation of ‘probability’. Underpinning both of these is the mathematical
approach, which is largely due to Russian mathematicians such as Kolmagorov.
It is based on axioms (e.g. probability is a number in the range 0 to 1; the
sum of the probabilities for something to occur and for it not to occur is 1;
etc.). This is very important for manipulating probabilities, but provides little
physical intuition about the concept.
For frequentists, the probability p of ‘something’ is defined in terms of a large
number N of essentially identical, independent trials: if the specified ‘something’
happens in s of these trials, p is defined as the limit of the ratio s/N , as N tends
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to infinity. Thus the probability of the sum of the numbers on two rolled dice
adding up to 10 can be determined in this way to be 1/12.
Bayesians attack this definition, as it requires a large number of ‘essentially
identical’ trials. They claim that to determine whether the trials are indeed ‘es-
sentially indentical’ requires the concept of probability, and hence the definition
is circular.
Given that a repeated series of trials is required, frequentists are unable
to assign probabilities to single events. Thus, with regard to whether it was
raining in Manchester yesterday, there is no way of creating a large number
of ‘yesterdays’ in order to determine the probability. Frequentists would say
that, even though they might not know, in actual fact it either was raining or
it wasn’t, and so this is not a matter for assigning a probability. And the same
remains true even if we replace ‘Manchester’ by ‘the Sahara Desert’.
Another example would be the unwillingness of a frequentist to assign a
probability to the statement that ‘the first astronaut to set foot on Mars will
return to Earth alive.’ This does not mean it is an uninteresting question,
especially if you have been chosen to be on the first manned-mission to Mars,
but then, don’t ask a frequentist to assess the probability.
A different type of example involves physical constants. Frequentists will
also not assign probabilities to statements involving the numerical values of
physical parameters e.g Does dark matter constitute more than 25% of the
the critical density for our Universe? This again is a situation which cannot be
checked by replicated tests. And again, it is either true or false, and not suitable
for frequentist probabilities. A similar argument applies to statements about
theories: a Frequentist will not allow probability assignments as to whether the
Higgs boson exists.
Bayesians have a very different approach. For them, probability is a personal
assessment of how likely they think something is to be true. It depends on their
own judgement and/or previous knowledge about the situation, and can hence
vary from person to person. Thus if I toss a coin, and ask you what is the
probability of the result being heads, you are likely to say 50%. But maybe
I cheated and looked at the coin, and saw that it was tails, so for me the
probability of heads is 0%. Or maybe I just gave it a quick glance, and think
(but am not certain) that it was tails, so I assign a probability of 20% to heads.
Because Bayesians have this personal view of probability, they would be
prepared to give numerical estimates for ‘one-off’ situations (e.g. who gets this
year’s Nobel Prize?), for parameter values (e.g. fraction of dark matter), or
concerning theories (e.g. existence of Higgs boson). Again, these numerical
assessments could vary from person to person.
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PERSONAL PROBABILITIES
This is a story I originally heard from Nobel Prize winner Frank
Wilczek in a slightly different context, but it illustrates the way that
for Bayesians the assessment of probability can differ from person to
person.
A shy postdoc is attending a workshop on the topic of ‘Extra Dimen-
sions’. Each evening, after an intensive day’s work, he goes to the local
bar, sits next to an empty chair and orders two glasses of wine, one for
himself and the other for the empty chair. By the third evening, the
barman’s curiosity cannot be controlled and he asks the postdoc why
he always orders the extra glass of wine. ‘I work on the theory of ex-
tra dimensions’, explains the postdoc, ‘and it is possible that there are
beautiful girls out there in 12 dimensions, and maybe by quantum me-
chanical tunneling they might appear in our 3-dimensional world, and
perhaps one of them might materialise on this empty chair, and I would
be the first person talking to her, and then she might go out with me’.
‘Yes’, says the barman, ‘but there are three very attractive real girls
sitting over there on the other side of this bar. Why don’t you go and
ask them if they would go out with you?’ ‘There’s no point’, replies the
postdoc, ‘that would be very unlikely.’
It sounds as if this is very personal and not conducive to numerical estimates.
But Bayesians’ assessment of probability should be consistent with the ‘fair bet’
concept. If a Bayesian believes that a certain statement has a 10% probability of
being true, they should be prepared to offer odds of 9 to 1 (or 1 to 9) to someone
who is prepared to bet with them on this being true (or false, respectively). With
a poor assessment of the probability, they would be in danger of losing money.
2 LIKELIHOODS, BAYES THEOREM AND PRI-
ORS
We now have a relevant digression into considering likelihood functions, and
then introduce Bayes Theorem and Priors, essential ingredients of the Bayesian
approach.
2.1 Likelihoods
The likelihood approach is a very powerful one for parameter determination,
and is also very much involved in Bayesian and Frequentist methods for this.
Likelihood ratios are also used for checking which of two theories provides a
better description of the data.
The likelihood function is best illustrated by a simple example. Imagine we
are performing a counting experiment for some fairly rare process. For example.
we may be interested in the flux µ of cosmic ray showers with energies above
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1020 electron volts. We have a large detector of known area, and find n0 high
energy showers (e.g. 2) when running the detector for one year. We want to
make a statement about the value of the actual flux µ and its uncertainty.
Assuming these cosmic rays are falling on earth at a constant rate, and
are independent of each other, if the true rate is µ, the conditional probability
P (n|µ) of obtaining n counts is given by the Poisson distribution as
P (n|µ) = e−µµn/n! (1)
Then the likelihood is defined by replacing n in the above formula by the ob-
served value n0. i.e.
L(µ|n0) = e−µµn0/n0! (2)
This likelihood is regarded as a function of µ, for the fixed data value n0. (For
example, if we observe 2 events, the likelihood is µ2 e−µ/2.) It is the probability
of observing the data, for different choices of µ. Then the likelihood estimate
of a parameter µ is that which maximises the likelihood i.e. It is the value of µ
which maximises the probability of observing the actual data n0. (In our case,
not surprisingly the likelihood estimate of µ is simply n0.) Values of µ for which
the likelihood is small are regarded as excluded, and the uncertainty on µ is
related to the width of the likelihood distribution.
A POISSON PUZZLE?
According to the Poisson distribution, if the expected number of ob-
servations in a specified time is µ, the probabilities P (1|µ) and P (2|µ)
are
P (1|µ) = µ e−µ, P (2|µ) = µ2 e−µ/2
For small µ, these are approximately µ and µ2/2 respectively. Given the
fact that the probability for observing one rare event in the time interval
is µ, why is the probability for observing two independent events equal
to µ2/2, rather than simply µ2, as perhaps expected from eqn. (4)?
It is really important not to confuse the Poisson probability P (n|µ) with the
likelihood function L(µ|n0), even though eqns. (1) and (2) bear a remarkable
similarity2 . The distinction should be easy in this case: P (n|µ) is a function of
the discrete variable n at fixed µ, while L(µ|n0) is a function of the continuous
variable µ at fixed n0 (see fig. 3). Furthermore, P (n|µ) are real probabilities,
while the likelihood L(µ|n0) cannot be interpreted as a probablity density (it
does not transform as expected for a probability density if the parameter is
chosen, for example, as 1/µ rather than µ).
2The ‘!’ symbol in eqns (1) and (2) not only expresses surprise (‘Wow! These equations
look very similar), but it also denotes the factorial.
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Figure 3: Illustration of the difference between the probability density distri-
bution for the integer variable n and the likelihood function for the continuous
parameter µ, for the Poisson distribution (see eqns. (1) and (2)). They involve
the same function of n and µ, but it is evaluated at fixed µ for the pdf , but at
fixed n for the likelihood.
2.2 Bayes theorem
If we consider two ‘events’ A and B (in the statistical sense), we can write the
probability P (A and B) of them both happening as
P (A and B) = P (A|B)P (B) (3)
where P (A|B) is the conditional probability of A happening, given the fact that
B has occurred. An example could be where we select a random day from last
year, and A is whether it was snowy in Oslo, and B that it was a December day.
Then Bayes Theorem says that the probability of choosing a snowy December
day is equal to the probability of it being snowy in December, multiplied by
31/365 (the probability of a random day being in December). If the probability
of A occuring does not depend on whether B has done so, eqn. (3) reduces to
the better-known result that
P (A and B) = P (A)P (B), for independent A and B (4)
CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY
Conditional Probability P (A|B) is the probability of A, given the fact
that B has happened. For example, the probability of obtaining a 4
on the throw of a dice is 1/6; but if we accept only even results, the
conditional probability for a 4, given that the number is even, is 1/3.
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Because P (AandB) is symmetric in A and B,
P (A and B) = P (A|B)P (B) = P (B|A)P (A) (5)
Then Bayes Theorem is derived from the second equality above:
P (A|B) = P (B|A)P (B)/P (A) (6)
i.e. It relates P (A|B) to P (B|A). (See section 2.4 for examples where these are
obviously not equal.)
It should be stressed that Bayes Theorem itself is not controversial, and
frequentists are willing to make use of it, provided the various probabilities are
genuine frequentist ones. The controversy begins when Bayesians replace A by
a theoretical parameter (and B is the observed data). The theorem then states
that
P (param|data) ∝ P (data|param)× P (param) (7)
where P (data|param) is just the likelihood function; P (param) is the Bayesian
prior density, and expresses what was known about the parameter before our
measurement; and P (param|data) is the Bayesian posterior probability density
for the parameter, and contains the information about the parameter obtained
by combining the prior information with that from our measurement.
BAYESIAN POSTERIORS
Jim Berger says that he and his wife have professions that are similar,
but with a small difference. He is a Bayesian Statistician and she is a
fitness trainer. The similarity is that they both aim to optimise poste-
riors, but while he wants to maximise them, she aims to minimise her
clients’ posteriors.
The frequentist objection to this is that the prior and the posterior both refer
to parameter values; while this is allowed for Bayesians, it is strictly forbidden
in the frequentist approach. In addition to this, complications are caused by
the need to choose a probability density for the prior.
2.3 Bayesian priors
In order to obtain the Bayesian posterior probability distribution from the like-
lihood function, the latter needs to be multiplied by the Bayesian prior. There
are several flavours of Bayesians, who have different motivations for their choice
of prior. In this article, we will concentrate on evidence-based priors. So if
in our Poisson example of Section 2.1, there was a previous measurement of
µ which gave the result 5 ± 1, the prior might be chosen as a Gaussian in µ,
centred on 5 with standard deviation 1 (and probably truncated at zero). Then
the posterior, assuming 2 observed counts, would be
P (µ|n0 = 2) = (µ2 e−µ/2)× (e−(µ−5)2/2/
√
2pi), (8)
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where the first factor on the right is the likelihood L(µ|n0 = 2), and the second
is the prior pi(µ).
This is all very well when previous data on µ exists. But what if our mea-
surement is ground-breaking, and essentially nothing is previously known about
µ? How do we now choose the prior pi(µ)? The ‘obvious’ answer is to choose a
prior that is independent of µ (but zero for unphysical negative µ), so as not to
favour any particular value of µ. However, do we really believe, as implied by
the constant prior, that µ is as likely to be in the range 10500 to 10500 + 0.5, as
in 0.1 to 0.6?
Another problem is that if we are aiming to use a flat prior to express our
ignorance about a parameter, it is not clear why we should choose one functional
form for the parameter rather than another. For example, if we are aiming to
provide a very precise measurement of the mass m of the tau neutrino, should
we parametrise our ignorance of its mass by a flat prior in m, m2, ln(m), etc?
Basically priors may be not bad for parametrising prior knowledge, but are not
so good for prior ignorance.
2.4 P (A|B) 6= P (B|A)
Bayes Theorem relates the conditional probabilities P (A|B) and P (B|A). Peo-
ple often confuse these two probabilities, and may erroneously think they are
the same. Thus journalists or even Laboratory Spokespersons may incorrectly
say that there is a 99.9% probability that some particle exists, rather than the
correct statement that under the null hypothesis that it does not, the data are
very unlikely.
A convincing example of their difference is provided by a database containing
just 2 pieces of information about everyone on Earth: their sex and whether or
not they are pregnant. We extract a random person from the database, who
turns out to be female. Given that the person is female, the chance of being
pregnant is about 3%. We then extract another random person, who turns out
to be pregnant. Given the fact that the person is pregnant, the probability that
they are female is 100%. i.e.
P (pregnant|female) P (female|pregnant) (9)
Similarly, if you select a card randomly from a deck of 52, the probability of
it being an ace, if it happens to be a spade, is 1/13; however, the probability of
a spade, given that it is an ace, is 1/4.
2.5 A Bayesian example
Imagine that you, a Bayesian, are betting on the results of coin flips. Each time
you bet ‘Heads’, and for the first 5 flips it comes down ‘Tails’. Given that the
probability of being wrong 5 times is 3%, should you suspect it is not a fair
coin?
We regard this as a parameter-estimation problem, and want to see whether
the probability pH of ‘Heads’ is consistent with 0.5. The data (no heads in 5
9
spins) enables us to calculate the likelihood function, but in order to extract
the posterior probability as a function of pH , we must multiply the likelihood
by a prior pi(pH). Now if the person betting against us is a complete stranger,
we might assign a constant value for pH in the range 0 to 1; then the posterior
is such that pH = 0.5 looks unlikely. On the other hand, if it is our local
village priest, we are so convinced that he is honest, we use a delta function at
pH = 0.5, and then even if the coin continues to fall down ‘Tails’, we will still
believe that it is fair. Thus our conclusion depends very much on which prior
we choose.
Given the freedom to select one’s prior, it seems as if Bayesian intervals for
a parameter can be very dependent on this choice. But in some cases, the ‘data
overwhelms the prior’, and the result becomes very insensitive to the choice
of prior. For example, the mass of the intermediate vector boson (Z0) was
measured at the LEP (Large Electron Positron) Collider at CERN. The result
was that the likelihood function was essentially a Gaussian at 91,188 MeV/c2,
with a width of 2 MeV/c2. A Bayesian now has to multiply this by the prior
probability density for the Z0 mass. However, any reasonable choice of prior
will vary very little over the range of a few parts in 105, and so in this case the
posterior is essentially independent of the prior.
3 PARAMETER DETERMINATION: BAYESIAN
APPROACH
We illustrate the Baysian approach using a simple example of the determination
of the lifetime of some radioactive material. The probability density p for a decay
at time t is given by
p(t|τ) = (1/τ) e−t/τ (10)
where τ is the lifetime we want to estimate. We can estimate τ from a set of
decays at observed times ti. To simplify the problem we assume we have only
one decay at time t1 (which will not give us a very accurate estimate of τ).
The likelihood is
L(τ) = (1/τ) e−t1/τ , (11)
and we have to multiply this by our choice of prior for τ , to obtain the posterior
p(τ |t1) = L(τ)pi(τ). As usual, there is a choice for pi(τ) of an evidence-based
prior derived from a previous measurement (in which case our posterior and the
resulting range for τ will be based not only on our measurement, but also on the
previous one), ignorance, theoretical motivation, etc. Because in many cases the
choice of prior is not unique, Bayesian analyses are supposed to present results
for several plausible priors, so as to investigate the sensitivity of the result to
the choice of prior.
Once the posterior is available, several options are available for determining
a range of preferred τ values at some chosen probability level γ, i.e.∫ τu
τl
p(τ |t1) dτ = γ. (12)
10
Possibilities include:
• A central range from τl to τu could be obtained by having probabilities of
(1− γ)/2 below the range, and (1− γ)/2 above it.
• The upper limit τUL is obtained by setting the limits of integration in eqn.
(12) from zero to τUL.
• In a similar manner, a lower limit τLL is obtained, using integration limits
τLL and infinity.
• The shortest posterior range in τ containing probabability γ is also popu-
lar, but does not correspond to the shortest range in the decay rate 1/τ ,
or for other reparametrisations of the variable of interest.
4 PARAMETER DETERMINATION: FREQUEN-
TIST APPROACH
We now consider the frequentist approach for the same problem as in the pre-
vious section.
The Neyman construction is used to show on a plot of the parameter τ
versus the data t the likely values of t for each τ (see fig. 4(a)). This is achieved
by using p(t|τ) of eqn. (10) for a given τ to select a region of t such that the
integral of p(t|τ) over this range of t is, say, 68%3; an example is denoted by the
horizontal line in the figure. By repeating this procedure for all τ , we obtain
the ‘confidence band’. In our example, the edges of the band are defined by
the straight lines t = 0.17τ and t = 1.8τ . Finally we use the actual observed
value t1 to read off the range of τ values (τl to τu, which are t1/1.8 and t1/0.17
repectively) for which t1 is a likely observation. For larger values of τ , t1 is too
small to be likely, and similarly for smaller τ , t1 is too large.
In a more plausible scenario where the data consisted of a set of observed
decay times ti, the data statistic could be the mean of the ti. Then the con-
fidence band would be narrower than in figure, and the range of acceptable τ
values would be shorter.
An important feature of this construction is that it does not require a prior
distribution for τ , thus avoiding the possible ambiguity that that would have
introduced. Another point to note is that the frequentist approach does not
claim that the range τl to τu is probable. Nor does it make any statement about
different values within this range; it is merely that this is the range of τ values
for which the observed data is likely (at the chosen confidence level).
Fig. 4(b) shows a more interesting example. An experiment aims to measure
the temperature T of the fusion reactor at the centre of the sun, by using a
3This definition does not provide a unique range. The one we show has a probability of 16%
on either side of the shaded region, which is then known as a central interval. An alternative
would be to have the whole of the 32% on the left hand side of the confidence interval; this
would be useful for producing upper limits on τ .
11
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      (a)                                                 (b) 
 
                   t=0.17τ 
u 
                                                                               T 
 
 
                                                                       Tu 
 
 
                                                                         Tl 
                                                  t=1.8τ 
l 
 
 
                               t1             t                                                    øobs            ø 
Figure 4: The Neyman construction. (a) For the exponential parameter τ ,
the central confidence band between the lines t = 0.17τ and t = 1.8τ gives
the likely values (at the 68% level) of t for each τ . Then a vertical line at
the observed t1 intersects the edges of the confidence band at τl and τu, and
these define the frequentist range for τ . (b) Here the theory parameter is the
temperature T at the centre of the sun, and the data φ is the measured flux
of solar neutrinos, both in arbitrary units. A measurement of the flux φobs
determines a range of temperatures (Tl to Tu) at the sun’s centre.
month’s running of a solar neutrino detector to estimate the neutrino flux φ
from the sun. Assuming we know all about fusion processes and convection in
the sun, the properties of neutrinos, the performance of our detectors, etc, we
can construct at each T a region in φ such that there is a 68% probability the
experimental result would lie in it. Then we use the actual measured flux φobs
to determine the accepted range for T .
4.1 Coverage
For repetitions of an experiment using a particular statistical analysis to de-
termine a range for the parameter of interest, where the data sets differ from
each other just by statistical fluctuations, the coverage is the fraction of the
parameter’s intervals that contain the true value of the parameter. This can be
determined from Monte Carlo simulation, or in some simple cases analytically.
Coverage is a property of the statistical technique that is used to construct the
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intervals, and does not apply to a single measurement.
Techniques for which the coverage is equal to the nominal value (e.g. 68%)
for all values of the parameter are said to have exact coverage. If the coverage
drops below the nominal value, the method is said to under-cover. Frequentist
regard this as bad: if the actual coverage for determining the parameter is only
30% rather than the nominal 68%, just quoting the range for the parameter
as determined by that method is likely to mislead a reader into believing that
your result is more accurate than it really is. Over-coverage does not have this
problem, but it suggests that maybe the confidence intervals produced by that
method are more conservative (i.e. wider) than they need be.
A particularly important property of the Neyman construction is that the
confidence intervals for the parameter have the property of not undercovering.
This property is not guaranteed for other techniques (e.g. Bayesian, χ2, maxi-
mum likelihood, method of moments).
Figure 5: Coverage C for Poisson parameter intervals, as determined by the
∆(ln(L)) = 0.5 rule. Repeated trials (all using the same Poisson parameter µ)
yield different values of the observation n, each resulting in a range µl to µu for
µ; then C is the fraction of trials that give ranges which include the value of
µ chosen for the trials. The coverage C varies with µ, and has discontinuities
because the data n can take on only discrete integer values. For large µ, C
seems to approach the expected 0.68.
Fig. 5 shows the coverage C for the following situation. An experiment
is performed to determine the rate µ of some Poisson counting experiment,
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and n counts are observed. The statistical procedure chosen for determining a
68% range for µ is the likelihood method with the ∆(lnL) = 0.5 rule to define
the ends of the range. In envisaged repetitions of the experiment, n will vary
according to a Poisson distribution with mean µ0. Then C(µ0) is the fraction
of the resulting ranges for µ which include µ0. The likelihood method does
not have the frequentist guarantee of coverage, and indeed large under- and
over-coverage occur, especially at low µ[2].
5 PARAMETER DETERMINATION: COMMON
ISSUES
Here we discuss some issues that are common to both Frequentist and Bayesian
approaches.
5.1 Parameters with limited range
Very often a physical parameter has meaning only over a limited range. For
example, the square of the mass of the neutrino (m2ν) produced in nuclear beta
decay cannot be negative, the branching ratio for some particular decay mode
of an elementary particle must be between zero and one, etc. Bayesians can
incorporate this information by setting the prior for the parameter to zero in
the non-physical region. This ensures that the best estimate of a parameter or
an upper limit for it are guaranteed to be physical. In contrast, a frequentist
upper limit could well turn out to be unphysical, or the range for m2ν could be
empty (i.e. there was no physical value of m2ν for which the data was likely); in
general Particle Physicists are unhappy with such a situation.
For many years, experiments estimating m2ν had ‘likelihood functions’ that
maximised at negative values. Upper limits for m2ν were then usually derived
by Bayesian methods.
5.2 Interpretation of µu ≥ µ ≥ µl
Both Bayesian and Frequentist methods of parameter determination end up
with a statement of the form µu ≥ µ ≥ µl at some probability level, but their
interpretations are very different.
For frequentists, the parameter µ is unknown, but it does have a true value
and, as discussed earlier, it is not suitable for probability statements. So the
probability refers to the range µl to µu. If the experiment were to be repeated
many times, a series of ranges for µ would be obtained, and the probability
refers to what fraction of these ranges contain the true value; this is just the
coverage mentioned in Section 4.1. Thus frequentists regard the ends of the
range as random variables.
For Bayesians, µu and µl have been detemined by the experimental analysis,
and are considered fixed; Bayesians do not want to be involved in deciding what
would have happened in hypothetical repetitions of the experiment. But they
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Table 1: Interpretations of “µu ≥ µ ≥ µl at 68% confidence level”
Bayes Frequentist
What is fixed? µu, µl µ
What is variable? µ µu, µl
What does 68% proba-
bility apply to?
Single measurement: percentage
of µ’s posterior in range
Set of measurements: percentage
of ranges µl → µu that contain µ
are prepared to treat the unknown physical constant as if it were a random
variable, and for them the probability refers to the fraction of the Bayesian
posterior probability density for µ is within the quoted range.
5.3 Dealing with systematics
Very often, in trying to estimate a parameter, some other quantity involved in
the analysis is not known exactly, and this can affect the deduced range for
the parameter of interest. For example, in the original Reines and Cowan ex-
periment [3] to discover the electron neutrino, a detector sensitive to neutrinos
interacting in it was built close to a powerful nuclear reactor. However, there
were also background processes which mimic the interactions of the reactor neu-
trinos. Then the observed number of counts n is likely to be Poisson distributed
with mean b+ s:
P (n) = e−(b+s) (b+ s)n/n! (13)
where b is the expected background, and s is the signal rate. If b is precisely
known, s is the only unknown parameter, and can be determined essentially as
described earlier. But if there is some uncertainty in the expected value of b,
this results in a systematic uncertainty in the answer. Statisticians refer to b as
a nuisance parameter.
Bayesians tend to treat all parameters (i.e. those of physical interest and
nuisance parameters) in a similar manner. Thus, assuming that the background
b has been estimated in a subsidiary counting experiment as m0 while the result
of the main measurement of s + b was n0, they would start by writing the
likelihood for s and b as
L(s, b|n0,m0) = (e−(s+b) (s+ b)n0/n0!)× (e−b bm0/m0!) (14)
Next this is multiplied by the chosen prior pi(s, b) for s and b, to give the posterior
probability p(s, b) for the parameter of interest s and the nuisance parameter
for the background b. Then this is integrated (or ‘marginalised’) over b to give
the probability density just for the parameter of interest:
p(s) =
∫
p(s, b) db (15)
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Finally the required parameter range is extracted from p(s) e.g. a central 68%
range.
In contrast, frequentists start from the probability density p(n,m|s, b) for
observing any n and m as
p(n,m|s, b) = (e−(s+b) (s+ b)n/n!))× (e−b bm/m!) (16)
The fully frequentist method consists in performing a Neyman construction to
produce a confidence belt for likely data (n,m) as a function of the parameters
(s, b). In analogy with the simpler problems discussed earlier, the actual data
(n0,m0) is then used to read off the region in parameter space (s, b) for which
the data is likely. If a range just for s is desired, it could be taken as the extrema
of the (s, b) region, although this will give rise to overcoverage.
There are also various approximate methods, which are simpler than the
full Neyman construction and which tend to produce less overcoverage (but for
which the frequentist guarantee of coverage no longer applies). An example is
the profile likelihood approach, in which the probability p(n,m|s, b) is replaced
by pprof (n,m|s, bbest(s)), where bbest(s) is the value of b which maximises the
probability for that value of s; because bbest(s) is a function of s, the profiled
probability depends on the single parameter s, which simplifies the problem.
PROFILE LIKELIHOOD
In many situations, the probability of observing a particular set of data
d depends not only on a parameter of physical interest φ (e.g. the
mass of the Higgs boson), but also on some other so-called nuisance
parameters ν (e.g. a scale factor for correcting jet energies as measured
in the detector). Then the likelihood L(φ, ν|d) is a function of both sets
of parameters φ and ν. In order to draw conclusions about φ, it is ofter
helpful to consider the profile likelihood Lprof (φ, νmax(φ)|d), where for
each value of φ, the nuisance parameters are chosen to maximise the
full likelihood L(φ, ν|d), i.e. νmax varies with φ. However, Lprof now
is a function just of φ but not of the nuisance parameters ν, thereby
simplifying the problem of making inferences about the parameter of
interest φ, at the cost of losing some of the properties of the likelihood
function.
Rather than maximising L with respect to ν, Bayesian methods tend
to marginalise, i.e. integrate the likelihood with respect to ν, usu-
ally after using priors for ν, to convert L into a posterior probability
distribution for φ.
For the case where L is a multi-dimensional Gaussian distribution such
as
L ∝ exp{−(aφ2 + 2bφν + cν2)},
marginalisation over ν or profiling with respect to it will give the same
functional form for the modified likelihoods.
Ref. [4] contains a longer discussion of systematics, while Demortier[5] deals
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with ways of incorporating systematics in both parameter determination and
hypothesis testing.
6 HYPOTHESIS TESTING
Possibly more interesting than Parameter Determination is Hypothesis Testing.
Here the issue is to decide which of two (or more) competing theories provides
a better fit to some data. For example, was data collected at the Large Hadron
Collider at CERN in the first half of 2012 more consistent with what is known as
the Standard Model (S.M.) of Particle Physics without anything new, or with
the production of the Higgs boson in addition to the known S.M. processes?
(See fig. 6)
Figure 6: The observed distribution in the CMS experiment for the effective
mass mγγ of pairs of γs produced in high energy proton-proton collisions at
CERN’s LHC. If the Higgs boson exists and decays to a pair of γs, it could result
in a peak centred on the mass of the Higgs. Otherwise, the expected distribution
is expected to be smooth. In the main plot, the events are weighted according to
their quality; the inset shows unweighted events. The apparent peak around 125
GeV is part of the evidence for the existence of a new particle, whose properties
seem consistent with those expected for a Higgs boson.
In Particle Physics, for reasons to be explained below, it is much more com-
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mon to use a frequentist method to decide. In other fields, Bayesian approaches
tend to be favoured. We discuss Bayesian methods briefly in section 7.
6.1 Frequentist approach
The first task is to choose some data statistic t which will help distinguish
between the hypotheses. In the simple case of a counting experiment, where the
data consists just of the number of accumulated counts n0 for a given amount
of running time, it could simply be n0. Then in most cases new physics would
manifest itself in a larger number of counts when the expected rate is s + b,
than if there were just background; here s and b are the expected signal and
background rates respectively.
In more complicated cases, the data could consist of one or more histograms
or multi-dimensional distributions. Then usually t is chosen as a likelihood ratio
for the data, assuming the two hypotheses:
t = L1(H1|d)/L0(H0|d) (17)
where L1 is the likelihood for H1 (the hypothesis of signal + background),
given the data, while L0 is for the background only hypothesis H0, given the
same data. When the hypotheses are completely specified without any free
parameters, they are known as ‘simple hypotheses’ and the above formulation
is satisfactory. Then the Neyman-Pearson lemma[6] says that if we choose H0
based on the likelihood ratio being below some suitably defined cut-off, this will
guarantee that we will achieve the lowest rate for “Errors of the Second Kind”
(i.e.incorrectly selecting H0 when H1 is true), for a given rate for “Errors of the
First Kind” (i.e. rejecting H0 when it is true ).
If, however, one or more of the hypotheses involves free parameters (‘com-
posite hypotheses’), the Neyman-Pearson lemma does not apply. Nevertheless
a form of the likelihood ratio, such as the ratio of profile likelihoods, is often
used as a method that may well be nearly optimal.
6.2 p-values
For the null hypothesis H0, the expected distribution of our test statistic t is
f0(t). Then for a given observed value tobs, the p-value is the fractional area
in the tail of f0(t) for t greater than or equal to tobs. For definiteness we
consider the single-sided upper tail (assuming that the alternative hypothesis
yields larger values of tobs), but lower or 2-sided tails could be appropriate in
other cases.
A small p-value means that the data are not very consistent with the hy-
pothesis. Apart from the possibility that the cause of the discrepancy is new
physics, it could be due to an unlikely statistical fluctuation, an incorrect imple-
mentation of the hypothesis being tested, an inaccurate allowance for detector
effects, etc.
As more and more data are acquired, it is possible that a small (and perhaps
not physically significant) deviation from the tested null hypothesis could result
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in the p0 becoming small as the data become sensitive to the small deviation.
For example, a set of particle decays may be expected to follow an exponential
distribution, but there might be a small background characterised by decays at
very short times, and which is not allowed for in the analysis. A small amount
of data might be insensitive to this background, whereas a large amount of data
might give a very small p-value for a test of exponential decay, even though the
background is fairly insignificant. With enough data, we may be able to include
physically motivated corrections to our naive H0. The possibility of a statisti-
cally significant but physically unimportant deviation has been mentioned by
Cox[7].
It is extremely important to realise that a p-value is the probability of ob-
serving data like that observed or more extreme, assuming the hypothesis is
correct. It is not the probability of the hypothesis being true, given the data.
These are not the same - see section 2.4.
Many of the negative comments about p-values are based on the ease of
misinterpreting them. Thus it is possible to find statements that of all experi-
ments quoting p-values below 5%, and which thus reject H0, many more than
5% are wrong (i.e H0 is actually true). In fact, the expected fraction of these
experiments for which H0 is true depends on other factors, and could take on
any value between zero and unity, without invalidating the p-value calculation.
6.3 p-values for two hypotheses
With two hypotheses H0 and H1, we can define a p-value for each of them.
We adopt the convention that H1 results in larger values for the statistic t
than does H0. Then p0 is defined as the upper tail of f0(t), the probability
density function (pdf) for observing a measured value t when H0 is true. It
is conventional to define p1 by the area in the lower tail of f1(t) (i.e towards
the H0 distribution) – see Fig. 7(b), which shows the probability densities for
obtaining a value t of a data statistic, for hypotheses H0 and H1. For a specific
value tobs, the p-values p0 and p1 correspond to the tail areas above tobs for the
H0 pdf , and below tobs for H1, respectively.
4 Then tcrit is the critical value of t
such that its p0 value is equal to a preset level α for rejecting the null hypothesis.
The p1-value when t = tcrit is denoted by β, and the power of the test
is 1 − β. The power is the probability that we successfully reject the null
hypothesis, assuming that the alternative is true. We expect the power to
increase as the signal strength in H1 becomes stronger, and the pdfs for H0 and
H1 become more separated.
Depending on the separation of the two pdfs and on the value of the data
statistic t, several situations are now possible (see Table 2):
• p1 is small, but p0 acceptable. Then we accept H0 and reject H1. i.e. we
exclude the alternative hypothesis.
4If t is a discrete variable, such as a number of events, then ‘above’ is replaced by ‘greater
than or equal to’, and correspondingly for ‘below’.
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Figure 7: Expected distributions for a statistic t for H0 = background only
(solid curves) and for H1 = background plus signal (dashed curves). In (a),
the signal strength is very weak, and it is impossible to choose between H0
and H1. As shown in (b), which is for moderate signal strength, p0 is the
probability according to H0 of t being equal to or larger than the observed t0.
To claim a discovery, p0 should be smaller than some pre-set level α, usually
taken to correspond to 5σ; tcrit is the minimum value of t for this to be so.
Similarly p1 is the probability according to H1 for t ≤ t0. The exclusion region
corresponds to t0 in the 5% lower tail of H1. In (b) there is an intermediate “No
decision” region. In (c) the signal strength is so large that there is no ambiguity
in choosing between the hypotheses. In order to protect against a downward
fluctuation in a situation like (a) resulting in an exclusion of H1 when the curves
are essentially identical, CLs is defined as p1/(1− p0) (see Section 6.6).
• p0 is very small, and p1 acceptable. Then we accept H1 and reject H0.
This corresponds to claiming a discovery.
• Both p0 and p1 are acceptable. The data are compatible with both hy-
potheses, and we are unable to choose between them.
• Both p0 and p1 are small. The choice of decision is not obvious, but
basically both hypotheses should be rejected.
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5σ DISCOVERY, 95% EXCLUSION
Searches for new phenomena in Particle Physics typically choose the
‘Standard Model’ as the null hypothesis H0, and a specific form of
New Physics as H1. The exclusion level for H1 is usually set at 5%,
whereas that for rejecting H0 (and perhaps claiming the discovery of
New Physics) is usually ‘5σ’, i.e p0 ≤ 3× 10−7.
Some (not very convincing) reasons for the stringent criterion for reject-
ing H0 include:
• The past history of false discovery claims at 3σ and 4σ levels.
• The possibility that systematic effects have been underestimated.
• The Look Elsewhere Effect (see Section 6.5).
• Subliminal Bayesian reasoning that the Standard Model is intrin-
sically more likely to be true than some specific speculation about
New Physics.
• The embarrassment of having to withdraw a spectacular but in-
correct claim of discovering New Physics.
In contrast, incorrect exclusion of New Physics is not regarded as so
dramatic, and so the weaker criterion of 5% is used. As Glen Cowan
has remarked, “If you are looking for your car keys and are 95% sure
they are not in the kitchen, it’s a good idea to start looking somewhere
else”[8].
Fig 8(a) illustrates the (p0, p1) plot for defining various decision regions.
Table 2: Choosing between two hypotheses, based on p0 and p1.
p0 p1 Result If H0 true If H1 true
Very small O.K. Discovery Error of 1st kind Correct choice
O.K. Small Exclude H1 Correct choice Error of 2
nd kind
O.K. O.K. Make no choice Loss of efficiency Loss of efficiency
Very small Small ? ? ?
6.4 p-values or likelihoods?
Rather than calculating p-values for the various hypotheses, we could use their
likelihoods L0 and L1. While p-values use tail areas beyond the observed statis-
tic, the likelihood is simply the height of the pdf at tobs. We return to likelihood
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Figure 8: Plots of p0 against p1 for comparing a data statistic t with two hy-
potheses H0 and H1, whose expected pdfs for t are assumed to be two Gaussians
of peak separation ∆µ, and of equal width σ (see fig. 7). (a) For a pair of pdfs
with a given separation, the allowed values of (p0, p1) lie on a curve or straight
line (shown solid in the diagram). As the separation ∆µ increases, the curves
approach the p0 and p1 axes. Rejection of H0 is for p0 less than, say, 3× 10−7;
here it is shown as 0.05 for ease of visualisation. Similarly exclusion of H1 is
shown as p1 < 0.1. Thus the (p0, p1) square is divided into four regions: the
largest rectangle is when there is no decision, the long one above the p0-axis is
for exclusion of H1, the high one beside the p1-axis is for rejection of H0, and the
smallest rectangle is when the data lie between the two pdfs. For ∆µ/σ = 3.33,
there are no values of (p0, p1) in the “no decision” region. In the CLs procedure,
rejection of H1 is when the statistic t is such that (p0, p1) lies below the diagonal
dotted straight line. (b) Contours of constant likelihood ratio r = L0/L1 for
Gaussian pdfs. The upper right region is inaccessible; the diagonal line from
(0,1) to (1,0) corresponds to the pdfs lying on top of each other i.e. no sen-
sitivity. The diagonal through the origin is when tobs is mid-way between the
two pdfs. With larger separation of the Gaussian pdfs and for constant p0 the
likelihood ratio increases.
ratios in Section 7.
As mentioned in section 6.1, the Neyman-Pearson lemma provides the best
way of choosing between two simple hypotheses, but even when one or both
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hypotheses contain free parameters, the likelihood ratio may well be a suitable
statistic for summarising the data and for helping choose between the hypothe-
ses. In general, it will be necessary to generate the expected distributions of
the likelihood ratio according to the hypotheses H0 and H1, in order to make
some deduction based on the observed likelihood ratio; for composite hypothe-
ses there are of course the complications caused by the nuisance parameters.
The decision process may well be based on the p-values p0 and p1 for the two
hypotheses (see fig. 8). In that case, the procedure can be regarded as either a
likelihood ratio approach, with the p-values simply providing a calibration for
the value of the likelihood ratio; or as a p-value method, with the likelihood
ratio merely being a convenient statistic.
6.5 Look Elsewhere Effect
If you are playing cards, and in your hand of 13 cards you observe that you have
4 queens, you might think that that is very unusual. Indeed the probability of
a random set of 13 cards containing 4 queens is 0.0026. However, since you
decided that ‘4 queens’ was unusual only after you looked at your cards, you
might have been equally surprised by 4 kings; or 4 jacks; or ace, two, three, four
of the same suit; etc. Taking these into account, the probability of a surprising
hand of cards similar to what we had is going to be a fair bit larger than 0.0026.
A similar effect explains why a seemingly improbable event in our every-day
life (e.g. a chance meeting with someone we had been thinking about recently)
may in fact be much more likely, if we have not decided at the beginning of the
day that this specific event would be a real coincidence if it happened.
Often in High Energy Physics, we are looking for some new phenomenon.
Thus we may be searching for a new particle, whose mass is not pre-defined, in
a histogram such as that of fig. 6. When we observe an enhancement, we can
calculate the p-value (the chance of observing a statistical fluctuation at least
as big as the one in our data, assuming that no such particle in fact exists),
at the observed mass. But this of course underestimates the chance of having
a fluctuation anywhere in our mass distribution, which we might mistakenly
ascribe to a new particle. We thus need to calculate the probability of observing
an effect at least as impressive as ours, anywhere in our mass distribution. In
Particle Physics, this dilution of the significance is known as the Look Elsewhere
Effect (LEE).
Similar considerations are relevant for searches in other fields. Thus claims
for discoveries of gravitational waves would need to calculate the chance of a
statistical fluctution mimicking the observed effect not only at the observed
time, frequency and signal structure, but anywhere in the whole dynamic range
of these variables for which a real signal is possible.
Of course, specifying where exactly ‘Elsewhere’ is is fraught with ambiguities.
Thus for the above example of searching for a new particle, fig. 6 is relevant
for the possibility of it decaying to 2 photons, but other decay modes could be
possible, and hence could be relevant to the LEE. Similarly, maybe the particle
we are considering cannot be produced enough at high masses for us to have
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the chance of detecting it, so the whole mass range is not relevant for the LEE.
The conclusion is that when p-values are corrected for the LEE, it is important
to specify exactly what has been taken into account.
6.6 CLs
The CLs method[9, 10] was introduced in the LEP experiments at CERN in
searches for new particles. When evidence for such a particle is not found, the
traditional frequentist approach is to exclude its production if p1 is smaller than
some preset level γ, which in Particle Physics is typically set at 5%. However,
there is then a 5% probability that H1 could be excluded, even if the experiment
was such that the H0 and H1 pdfs lay on top of each other i.e. there was no
sensitivity to the production of the new phenomenon. To protect against this,
the decision to exclude H1 is based on p1/(1 − p0), known as CLs5. It is thus
the ratio of the left hand tails of the pdfs for H1 and H0. Fig 8(a) shows a
(p0, p1) region for which H1 is excluded by CLs. The fact that it is clearly
smaller than for the standard frequentist exclusion region is the price one has
to pay for the protection it provides against excluding H1 when an experiment
has no sensitivity to it. We regard it as conservative frequentist.
It is interesting that the CLs exclusion line in fig. 8(a) for the case of two
Gaussians is identical to that obtained by a Bayesian procedure for determining
the upper limit on µ1 when the latter is restricted to positive values, and with
a uniform prior for µ1. In a similar manner, the standard frequentist procedure
agrees with the Bayesian upper limit when the restriction of µ1 being positive
is removed.
In principle, similar protection against discovery claims when the experiment
has no sensitivity could be employed, but it is deemed not to be necessary be-
cause of the different levels used for discovery and for exclusion of H1 (typically
3× 10−7 and 0.05 respectively).
6.7 When neither H0 or H1 is true
It may well be that neither H0 nor H1 is true. With no more information
available, it is of course impossible to say what we expect for the distribution
of our test statistic t. On the plot of fig. 8(a), our data may fall in the small
rectangle next to the origin.
It is certainly not true that a small value for p0 necessarily implies that H1
is correct, although for small enough p0, ruling out H0 is a possibility.
7 BAYESIAN METHODS
The Bayesian approach is more naturally suited to making statements about
what we believe about two (or more) hypotheses in the light of our data. This
5This stands for ‘confidence level of signal’, but it is a poor notation, as CLs is in fact a
ratio of p-values, which is itself not even a p-value, let alone a confidence level.
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contrasts with Goodness of Fit, which involves considering other possible data
outcomes, but focusses on just one hypothesis.
All Bayesian methods involve the likelihood function, possibly modified to
take into account nuisance parameters. For Hypothesis Testing, some form of a
ratio of (modified) likelihoods is usually involved. For simple hypotheses, this
is just L0(H0)/L1(H1), where Li(Hi) = p(x|Hi), the probability (density) for
observing data x for the hypothesis Hi. The issue is going to be how nuisance
parameters6 ν are dealt with for non-simple hypotheses. For the likelihood ap-
proach (as opposed to the Bayesian one, which also requires priors), it is usual to
profile them i.e. the profile likelihood is Li(Hi|νbest), where νbest is the set of pa-
rameters which maximise L. In Particle Physics, the profile likelihood approach
is a popular method for incorporating systematics in parameter determination
problems.
The complications of applying Bayesian methods to model selection in prac-
tice are due to the choices for appropriate priors. This is particularly so for
those parameters which occur in the alternative hypothesis H1 but not in the
null H0.
Loredo[11] and Trotta[12] have provided reviews of the application of Bayesian
techniques in Astrophysics and Cosmology, where their use is more common than
in Particle Physics.
7.1 Bayesian posterior probabilities
When there are no nuisance parameters involved, the ratio of the posterior
probabilities for Hi is ppost(H0|x)/ppost(H1|x), where
ppost(Hi|x) = Li(Hi) pii, (18)
and pii is the assigned prior probability for hypothesis i. For example, the
hypothesis of there being a Higgs boson of mass 110 GeV might well be assigned
a small prior, in view of the exclusion limits from LEP.
With nuisance parameters, the posterior probabilities become
ppost(Hi|x) =
∫
Li(Hi|ν) pii(ν) pii dν (19)
where pii is the prior probability for hypothesis i and pii(ν) is the joint prior for
its nuisance parameters. i.e. we now have integrated over the nuisance param-
eters. This contrasts with the likelihood method, where maximisation with
respect to them is more usual. Even with pii(ν) being a constant, integration
and maximisation can select different regions of parameter space. An example
of this would be a likelihood function that has a large narrow spike at small ν,
and a broad but lower enhancement at large ν.
6For the purpose of model comparison, any parameters are considered as nuisance param-
eters, even if they are physically meaningful. e.g. the parameters of a straight line fit, the
mass of the Higgs boson, etc.
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In relation to all Bayesian methods, it is to be emphasised that the choice
of a constant prior, especially for multi-dimensional ν, is by no means obvious
(compare Section 2.3). Very often, there are several possible choices of variable
for the nuisance parameters, with none of them being obviously more natural
or appropriate that the others. Thus a point in 2-dimensional space could be
written as Cartesian (x, y) or polar (r, θ); constant priors in the two sets of
variables are different. Similarly in fitting data by a straight line y = a + b x,
using a seemingly innocuous flat prior for b = tan θ results in angles θ in the
range 0◦ to 89◦ have the same prior probability as those in the range 89◦ to
89.5◦.
It should be realised that the results for Hypothesis Testing are more sensi-
tive to the choice of prior than in parameter determination. Thus in parameter
determination, sometimes a prior is used which is constant over a wide range of
ν, and zero outside it. The resulting range for the parameter, as deduced from
its posterior, may well be insensitive to the range used, provided it includes
the region where the likelihood L(ν) is significant. For comparing hypotheses,
however, there can be parameters which occur in one hypothesis but not the
other. (An example of this is where H1 corresponds to smooth background plus
a peak, while H0 is just smooth background.) The widths of such priors affect
their normalisation, and hence also the Bayes factor (see next Section) directly.
On the other hand, in searches for a new particle of unknown mass, the
Bayesian probability for the particle existing will depend on the range of the
prior used for the particle’s mass - the wider the range, the lower the normalisa-
tion and hence the lower the probability7. At least qualitatively, this resembles
the effect of the LEE in the frequentist approach, where the significance of a
peak in a mass spectrum is diluted if the search extends over a wide mass range
(see section 6.5).
7.2 Bayes factor
For each hypothesis we define Ri = ppost/pi, where ppost and pi are respectively
the posterior and prior probabilities for hypothesis i. Thus R is just the ratio of
posterior and prior probabilities. Then the Bayes factor for the two hypotheses
H0 and H1 is B01 = R0/R1. If the two hypotheses are both simple, then this
is just the likelihood ratio. If either is composite, the relevant integrals are
required for ppost. A small value of B01 favours H1.
Demortier[13] has drawn attention to the fact that it can be useful to cal-
culate the minimum Bayes factor[14]. This is defined as above, but with the
extra nuisance parameters of H1 set at values that minimise B01, i.e. they are
as favourable as possible for H1. If even this value of B01 suggests that H1 is
not to be preferred, then it is a waste of time to investigate further since any
choice of priors for the extra parameters cannot make B01 smaller.
7This is an example of Occam’s Razor, whereby a simpler hypothesis may be favoured over
a more complex one.
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Table 3: Cost function. Typically the cost A assigned to a false discovery claim
would be larger than B, the cost for a failure to discover. There is zero cost for
making a correct decision.
H0 true H1 true
Accept H0 Correct choice. Cost =0 Failure to discover. Cost = B
Reject H0 False discovery claim. Cost = A Correct choice. Cost = 0
7.3 Other Bayesian methods
The Bayesian approach can be used in conjunction with Decision Theory, in
order to provide a procedure for choosing between two hypotheses. In addition
to any priors, a cost function has to be defined, which assigns a numerical
‘cost’ for each combination of the true hypothesis (H0 or H1), and the possible
decisions - see Table 3. The decision procedure is designed to minimise the
expected cost, as determined by the cost function and the expected distribution
of posterior probabilities for H0 and H1.
Because of the problems of assigning realistic costs, and the use of priors in
determining the posteriors for the hypotheses, there is little or no usage of this
approach in Particle Physics searches for New Physics.
Other Bayesian methods such as AIC, BIC,.... (Akaike Information Cri-
terion, Bayesian Information Criterion,.....) aim to provide approximations to
the Bayes factor, but which are easier to calculate. Given the powerful com-
putational facilities available nowadays, these methods are likely to decrease in
general usage. Again there is little or no experience of using them in Particle
Physics applications.
7.4 Why p is not equal to the likelihood ratio
There is sometimes discussion of why a likelihood ratio approach (or the Bayes
factor, if there are nuisance parameters) can give a very different numerical
answer to a p-value calculation. A reason some agreement might be expected is
that they are both addressing the question of whether there is evidence in the
data for new physics.
In fact they measure very different things. Thus p0 simply measures the
consistency with the null hypothesis, without any regard to the degree of agree-
ment with the alternative, while the likelihood ratio takes the alternative into
account. There is thus no reason to expect them to bear any particular rela-
tionship to each other. This can be illustrated by contours of constant values of
the likelihood ratio r = L0/L1 on a p0 versus p1 plot (see fig. 8(b)). The figure
is constructed by assuming that the pdfs for the two hypotheses H0 and H1 are
given by Gaussian distributions, both of unit width. Then at constant p0, it is
seen that the likelihood ratio can take a range of values, corresponding to the
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Gaussians having different separations. Thus with the Gaussian for H0’s pdf
centred at zero, a measured value of 5.0 yields a p0-value of 3×10−7, regardless
of the position of the H1 Gaussian. Such a small p-value is usually taken as
sufficient to reject H0. As the centre of the H1 Gaussian starts at µ1 = 0, the
two Gaussian pdfs are identical, and r = 1. With increasing µ1, p0 of course
remains constant, but r at first decreases to a minimum when µ1 = 5, but then
increases through unity when µ1 = 10 (i.e. the data is midway between the pdf
peaks), and then keeps on rising with further increases of the separation of the
pdfs. At that stage, the data are more in agreement with H0 than with H1,
despite the small value of p0.
8 CONCLUSION
Table 4: Comparison of Bayes and Frequentist approaches
Bayes Frequentist
Basis of method Bayes Theorem → posterior
probability distribution
Uses pdf for data, for fixed pa-
rameter values
Meaning of proba-
bility
Degree of belief Frequentist definition
Probability for pa-
rameters?
Yes No, no, no
Needs prior? Yes No
Choice of interval? Central, upper limit, shortest,... Choice of ordering rule
Data used Only the data you have Also other possible data
Needs ensemble
of possible experi-
ments?
No Yes (but often not explicit)
Obeys the Likeli-
hood Principle?
Yes No
Unphysical/empty
ranges possible?
Excluded by prior Can occur
Final statement Posterior prob dist Param values for which data is
likely
Do param ranges
cover?
Regarded as unimportant Built in
Include systematics Integrate over prior Extend dimensionality of fre-
quentist construction
We have seen how Bayesians and Frequentists differ fundamentally in the
way they consider probability. This then affects the way they approach the
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topics of parameter determination, and of choosing between two hypotheses.
Table 4 provides a summary of the differences between the two approaches.
A cynic’s view of the two techniques is provided by the quotation:
“Bayesians address the question everyone is interested in by using assump-
tions no-one believes, while Frequentists use impeccable logic to deal with an
issue of no interest to anyone.”
However, it is not necessary to be so negative, and for physics analyses at the
CERN’s LHC, the aim is, at least for determining parameters and setting upper
limits in searches for various new phenomena, to use both approaches; similar
answers would strengthen confidence in the results, while differences suggest the
need to understand them in terms of the somewhat different questions that the
two approaches are asking.
It thus seems that the old war between the two methodologies is subsiding,
and that they can hopefully live together in fruitful cooperation.
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